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Age, sex, qualifications and voting at recent English general elections: an 
alternative exploratory approach 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There has been a substantial switch in approaches to the study of British voting behaviour in recent 
decades, with much less attention being paid to individual voters’ social positions. This paper argues 
that such approaches can mis-represent the contexts within which voters are socialised and mobilised 
and are also technically problematic because social positions and attitudes may well be collinear – in 
which case ‘true’ relationships are difficult to uncover. Further, regression models that include 
variables representing social positions almost invariably look at the main effects only and pay no 
attention to the interactions among those variables. Using a newly-developed multilevel modelling 
approach to the analysis of multi-way contingency tables, this paper explores the relationships 
between respondents’ age, sex and qualifications and their voting at the last three general elections 
in England, using a large data set. It indicates that, contrary to recent work, respondents’ social 
positions are linked – through their attitudes – to their partisan choices, and that exploration of the 
interactions among those variables identifies important differences in how they voted. 
 
KEY WORDS: voting; England; class; exploratory analysis; large contingency tables 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been a substantial switch in approaches to the study of British voting behaviour over 
recent decades. The stress in early work was on social class, hence Pulzer’s (1967) statement that 
‘Class is the basis of British politics: all else is embellishment and detail’. Butler and Stokes’ (1969, 
1974) classic work was firmly set in that mould, while paying considerable attention to aspects of the 
‘embellishment and detail’. By the 1980s, however, the emphasis on class was challenged by work 
on dealignment, which observed increased variation in the degree to which a class’s members 
remained committed to ‘their’ party (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983; Evans and de Graaf, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the social class model (suitably modified to reflect changes in the country’s class 
structure) continued to inform major studies of voting at British elections, notably the series of 
books produced by the team that conducted the British Election Studies between 1983 and 1992 
(Heath et al., 1985; 2001: see also the critique in Crewe, 1986, and Heath et al.’s, 1987, response; 
and Franklin, 1985; Evans, 2000). Increasingly, however, the focus shifted away from an attention on 
class and towards behavioural models that focused on voters’ attitudes.  
 
One such approach, drawing its inspiration from Downs (1957; Grofman, 2004), looked to 
issues (such as the desirability of state involvement in the economy) on which voters and parties 
took distinctive ideological positions; voters support the party closest to them in ideological space.  
An alternative approach – advanced in Stokes’s critique of Downsian models – became known as 
valence voting (Stokes, 1963: for their British application see Clarke et al, 2004, 2010; Whiteley et al., 
2013); voters determine which party to support not on ideological grounds but rather on their 
perceptions of which party can best govern the country, based on both its record and its policy 
proposals. Thus, for example, all parties may have manifesto commitments to promote economic 
growth and keep unemployment, inflation and interest rates low; voters decide which is most likely 
to deliver on those promises – although in many cases using short-cut heuristics, such as the 
perceived quality of the party leaders, when making their decisions. 
 
The valence model has not gone unchallenged, however. Evans and Chzhen (2016a), for 
example, focus on an endogeneity issue: those who think a government has performed well in office 
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are more likely to be those who voted for it at the preceding election than those who did not. 
Whiteley et al. (2016, 236) responded that ‘The variables in the valence politics model … do not 
explain everything about electoral choice, but they provide powerful theoretical and empirical 
insights into what is going on in the minds of the voters. Supplemented by selected variables from 
[Downsian] spatial theory, the result is a parsimonious composite model that goes a long way 
toward providing a satisfactory explanation of voting in Britain and elsewhere’ – a conclusion with 
which Evans and Chzhen (2016b, 246) continued to disagree, claiming that ‘party preference dictates 
party performance evaluation, not vice versa‘ (their emphasis). 
 
In response to Evans and Chzhen, Whiteley at al. (2016, 236) claimed there is ‘no need to 
rummage around one more time in the dark recesses of the famed “funnel of causality”’ model of 
voting behaviour to seek explanations of British voting behaviour’. That model, initially developed by 
the ‘Michigan School’ of voting behaviour (Campbell et al., 1960; Bartels, 2016, provides an 
overview), presents the influences on voters’ decisions as located within a funnel.
1
 At its exit point is 
the vote decision. Furthest from it – at the funnel’s mouth – are relatively fixed variables, such as a 
voter’s age, sex, and social status. Moving into the funnel, those characteristics are causally linked to 
slightly more transient variables – such as the groups with which the individuals identify and their 
value orientations. These in turn are linked to their attitudes to the political parties and whether 
individuals identify with them; and then – approaching the funnel’s point – they are linked to their 
evaluations of candidates and parties and their policies, which are also influenced by perceptions of 
the external environment (economic conditions, for example).  
 
An approach to uncovering those various stages in the funnel of causation model – in 
particular, the links between voting behaviour and socio-demographic characteristics at the funnel’s 
mouth, which are the possible precursors of valence – is illustrated here with reference to recent 
British work, developing both substantive and technical arguments. Substantively, along with Evans 
and Tilley (2017), we claim that elements of the sociological model have been unnecessarily 
underplayed in recent analyses. Technically, we argue that most analyses insufficiently explore the 
relationships between sociological factors and voting behaviour – specifically the interactions among 
those factors – and use a recently-developed method for exploratory data analysis to identify them. 
 
This paper develops three main arguments, therefore. First, it contends that socio-
demographic variables remain important influences on British voting behaviour, so it is insufficient 
for analyses to focus at the end of the causal pathway to partisan choice; those variables located at 
the funnel’s mouth continue to influence voter choices through their relationship to individuals’ 
general political attitudes (even ideology: Scarbrough, 1984) and their positions on contemporary 
political issues. Secondly, it suggests that standard modelling approaches – such as binomial and 
multinomial logistic regressions – are limited in their capacity to uncover all of the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables in voting studies, especially those involving 
interactions among the socio-demographic influences on voter choice. Finally, recognising these first 
two points, it deploys an exploratory modelling procedure whose outputs have a very natural 
interpretation: it enables a clear identification of those socio-demographic groups who have a 
propensity both to hold particular attitudes on contemporary political issues and to vote in a 
particular way. 
 
Most studies of voting patterns – not only in the UK – are basically exploratory in their 
approach. They select a number of variables – respondent characteristics derived from survey 
instruments, for example – believed to be related to voter choices, and assess whether that is the 
                                                          
1
 See the large number of images of the funnel at https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=funnel+of+causality 
&biw=1333&bih=569&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwj_x_yR7cnKAhWHXRoKHfkS
BJoQsAQIHg – accessed 10 October 2017. 
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case using regression analyses. Although there are general expectations regarding the direction of 
the individual relationships, there are rarely specific hypotheses regarding their strength and 
intensity (both absolute and relative to other variables in the equation) – the theory on which the 
analyses are based does not specify the expected outcome in such detail. Hence the potential 
benefits of improved exploratory procedures, such as that advanced here. 
 
2. Funnelling voting decisions: from age, sex and qualifications to party choice 
 
Although the funnel of causation model implicitly underpins many discussions of British voting 
behaviour, it is rarely referred to explicitly and is often incorrectly implemented in analytical models 
and their empirical testing. 
 
2.1 Fixtures at the mouth of the funnel 
 
Three socio-demographic and -economic variables – or their equivalents – have been widely used in 
most studies of British voting: class, age, and sex. Traditionally, individuals’ class status was 
identified according to their occupation (in the simplest formulation between those in white-collar 
and blue-collar jobs) although as that distinction became increasingly blurred and the balance 
between the public and private employment sectors changed alternative formulations were sought 
(Dunleavy, 1979). More recently, alongside – if not replacing – occupational status analysts have 
employed individuals’ educational qualifications as an important indicator. In an economy 
increasingly dominated by the service sector, individuals’ skills as reflected in their qualifications 
provide the entrée to the higher-paid, more prestigious jobs; lifestyle differences follow from these 
contrasts in income and status, and may be reflected in political attitudes and partisan preferences. 
(Empirically, since their qualifications can be directly obtained from most adult respondents to 
questionnaires, this is a preferred indicator of status to occupation – and also to incomes, given the 
British reluctance to provide information on them – as a large proportion of the adult population 
may not currently be in the workforce. Further, qualifications reflect a lifetime cumulative 
experience; with income and occupational status people may move either up or down the ladder at 
points in their careers. Finally, as the questions are relatively straightforward for respondents to 
answer and for researchers to code they are less likely to be affected by misclassification error and 
consequent attenuation of effects.) 
 
Many empirical studies have identified variations in partisan preferences across different 
age groups (for example, Tilley, 2005; Tilley and Evans, 2014); in general, older people are more 
‘conservative’ in their views than their younger counterparts, and this is reflected in the relative 
preferences for different political parties. The usual ‘explanation’ for such differences is that older 
people have a greater ‘stake in society’ through, for example, home-ownership and aspirations for 
their children, and are more likely to vote for a ‘conservative’ party that promotes those individual 
values – hence the British Conservative party’s policies of promoting home ownership. Empirical 
studies have also identified differences between males and females in voting at British General 
Elections (Norris, 1996, 1999; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Annesley and Gains, 2016). 
 
There is considerable empirical evidence that different socio-demographic groups tend to 
favour one political party rather than others in the UK, therefore. The arguments regarding both 
class/partisan dealignment and the importance of valence issues have pushed these relationships 
into the background in many recent studies, however. In analyses of the 2010 British General 
Election, for example, Whiteley et al. (2013, 137) dismiss models of party choice using socio-
demographic variables alone on the basis that they provide only a poor goodness-of-fit – although 
they successfully predicted 71.5 per cent of respondents’ party choices in binomial logit models. 
Valence models, on the other hand, successfully predicted 87.7 per cent, and when the two models 
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were combined (with others) that only increased to 88.8 per cent. They concluded that use of the 
socio-demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, social class) is ‘obsolescent’ – unnecessary to a 
parsimonious model that can successfully predict how most people vote, even though socio-
demographic characteristics such as age, sex and qualifications may be important determinants of 
voters’ attitudes. But without including such variables in choice models the understanding of who 
votes what, and why, is compromised. Exactly the same stance is taken in their comparable analyses 
of voting at the 2015 election: ‘socio-demographics have the weakest explanatory power’ (Clarke et 
al., 2015, 118). Nevertheless, those variables are included in the final models in both books – they 
are, according to the usual phrasing, held constant (Whiteley et al., 2013, 115). This is an odd 
decision, for two reasons. 
 
The first reason is substantive. If the analyses were applying the funnel of causation model 
fully, they would be presenting the voting decision as – at least – a two-step process. People are 
socialised into adopting particular attitudes and partisan preferences, in which process their age, sex 
and social class/educational qualifications may be important. Those variables would then be related 
to their responses on the valence issues – as also would be their prior electoral decisions; in turn, 
their partisan choices might reflect their valence positions and, indirectly, their socio-demographic 
characteristics. This sequence can be recognised methodologically in a number of ways, as in path 
analysis models (which, however, are more readily fitted to data measured on interval and ratio 
scales than to those largely reliant on nominal categorisations, as in the example below).  
 
Secondly, by not employing the funnel of causation in this or a similar way, the implicit 
assumption underlying the modelling is that attitudes develop and partisan positions are taken in 
what are, in effect, socio-political vacuums (as in Clarke et al., 2016), which is clearly not the case. 
Most people learn in context, interacting not only with the political environment in general (through 
media reports, for example) but also with other voters, both individually and in groups – both 
informal and formal; much research demonstrates the important role of discussions within social 
networks in the formulation of attitudes and behaviour patterns (Johnston and Pattie, 2017). 
Inclusion of such background variables allows analysts to discover not only what those who support 
a particular party think but also who they are – and where they live, which may be very important 
too. (Paradoxically, although claiming that socio-demographics are of little relevance in models 
predicting individual voting behaviour, Clarke et al. – 2015, 142 – report ecological analyses at the 
constituency scale which suggest that individual characteristics play a major role in predicting 
variations in attitudes in different places, and hence in party choice: you can predict how people in 
an area vote by knowing what type of people they are.) Political parties also know that they are most 
likely to win support from those who share their values and policy positions – but they need to know 
who those people are most likely to be, and where they live, if they are to develop and successfully 
target electoral campaigns. 
 
Of course, as noted above, those promoting valence models nevertheless include socio-
demographic variables in their analyses. This repeats an error common to much analytical work on 
British voting behaviour (Johnston et al., 2017). In a multiple regression including two independent 
variables, the regression coefficients do not show change in the value of the dependent variable 
with a unit change in the value of the relevant independent variable. If the independent variables 
are X1 and X2 and the dependent is Y, then the coefficient for X1 shows the change in the value not of 
Y, but of the residuals of a regression of Y on X2, relative to the change in the values of residuals from 
a regression of X1 on X2. If the relationship between X1 and X2 is relatively weak (i.e. there is only 
slight collinearity between the two) this is not very problematic. If they are closely related, however, 
the residual (‘unexplained’) variances of Y, X1 and X2 may be little more than random and the 
multiple regression coefficients uninformative. (In a paper presented as ‘improving empirical 
analysis’, Bramber et al. – 2006 – note that some may respond that their points ‘are so obvious that 
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surely everyone already knows’ this. That was not borne out by their literature survey. The same 
appears to be the case regarding collinearity and its potential confounding impact on regression 
coefficients.)  
 
If valence attitudes are strongly related to socio-demographic variables, therefore, the 
relative importance of one set, and perhaps both, in accounting for voting patterns may be mis-
represented, and one’s influence under-stated relative to the other: Clarke et al.’s analyses of the 
2010 and 2015 elections may understate the importance of the socio-demographic variables. 
 
2.2 Exploring interactions 
 
Very few analyses of British voting behaviour, especially of categorical data derived from surveys, 
explore the full richness of the available data. For example, they may include variables for 
educational qualifications and sex, and fit regression models predicting whether respondents 
abstained at an election. Such models compare the marginal differences in the relevant contingency 
table (two sexes, by four qualification levels, by whether voted or not, perhaps) and may establish 
that women were more likely to turnout to vote than men and that those with degrees were less 
likely to abstain than those with no qualifications. But they do not indicate whether, for example, 
women with degrees were more or less likely than men with degrees to turn out. The interactions – 
differences  across the internal cells of the contingency table rather than just between the row and 
column totals – are usually ignored, thus assuming that each of the variables under consideration is 
homogeneous across the other (that men and women do not differ depending on their 
qualifications; and/or that people with a particular qualification do not differ depending on whether 
they are male or female). The two groups may indeed be homogeneous and there are no 
(substantial and/or statistically significant) intra-group variations – but we do not know because the 
question isn’t asked (though see Russell, 1997). 
 
Despite pressure from a number of authors regarding the issue more generally (see, for 
example, Gelman, 2008; Elwert and Winship, 2010; Hainemuller et al., 2016), such oversight of 
interaction effects is a very common feature of studies of British voting behaviour. This is 
unfortunate because many of those studies are, in effect, exploratory analyses addressing the main 
effects only without investigating multiplicative effects through interaction terms. In addition, few 
test specific hypotheses; independent variables are included in the expectation that they may be 
related to the dependent variables, perhaps just because previous studies have found them to be. 
The potential full richness of the data is thus not realised; clear and strong relationships may lay 
undiscovered and full understanding of voting behaviour retarded as a consequence. 
 
2.3 A way forward? 
 
Two conclusions have been drawn from the above discussion as the basis for further work to be 
reported here: 
• That analyses of British voting behaviour should not downgrade the relative importance of 
socio-demographic variables in seeking to appreciate patterns of party choice. Different 
social groups may, for a variety of reasons, develop different attitudes on the important 
issues being addressed at an election, and by exploring those attitudes alone without any 
appreciation of how they vary across the population only an incomplete understanding of 
who votes for what, and why, is obtained. 
• That those analyses should investigate the interactions among a model’s independent 
variables so as to explore more fully how groups differ not only between each other but also 
internally in their attitudes and behaviour. 
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The remainder of this paper uses a recently-developed approach to the study of large contingency 
tables – characteristic of British voting studies deploying survey data – to explore the sorts of 
variations that the preceding discussion has suggested lie very largely unaddressed. It does not 
deploy, as is commonly the case, multiple regression-like models – especially in their binomial and 
multinomial forms using categorical data. Most analyses use relatively small samples and yet divide 
their respondents into a substantial number of different, many of them multiple, categories. With 
these, extracting robust – and interpretable – estimates of interaction coefficients is difficult, indeed 
sometimes technically infeasible. The approach developed here – set out in full methodological 
detail elsewhere (Jones et al., 2015, 2016; Johnston et al., 2015, 2016) – avoids those problems 
while providing clear indications of the patterns within a relatively large data set – although even 
with over 20,000 observations and a contingency table comprising only three independent and one 
dependent variable the problems of robustness remain. 
 
3. Modelling large contingency tables 
 
Many social science data sets that involve the calculation of ratio values face the problem that some 
of those calculations involve small numbers – either as the numerator or the denominator, or both 
(Jones and Kirby, 1980; Clayton and Kaldor, 1987). A small change in either can result in a substantial 
change in the derived ratio – one that may reflect little more than the chance variation associated 
with a stochastic generating process. It is therefore difficult to determine whether there are 
significant differences  in the derived ratios between contingency table cells when many are derived 
from small numbers of observations. Even what appear, on the surface, to be large sample sizes can 
become problematic when relatively large contingency tables are analysed as such cells with small 
numbers could be relatively frequent. A 2 x 6 x 4 x 6 table (such as the one analysed later in this 
paper) has 288 cells, for example, so that for an average of 20 per cell the dataset would need to 
comprise 5,760 respondents – much larger than many voter surveys. With anticipated variation 
around that average there would be cells with few observations. In addition, many data sets have 
non-uniform distributions; those that are positively-skewed would have a large number of fairly 
empty cells. Moreover, collinearity between predictor variables will lead to bunching of respondents 
in certain cells of the table and a dearth of observations elsewhere. Relatively few voter surveys are 
very large, and many of their analyses involve more than four multi-member nominal classifications. 
In such cases, full exploration of the interactions between variables are difficult to conduct without, 
in effect, stabilising the incidence rates to take cell sizes into account (Manda and Leyland, 2006). 
 
A way forward for addressing this problem has recently been proposed, using multilevel, 
random-effects modelling in a Bayesian statistical framework (Jones et al., 2015, 2016). For each 
multi-way contingency table cell it derives an expected value, by assuming that the proportion of 
individuals with that characteristic is the same as for all age and qualification groups, across both 
sexes. If 15 per cent of the total sample voted UKIP, for example, the model expects that figure to 
apply to every age by sex by qualifications cell of the contingency table as the null model of no 
effect. It then takes the ratio of the observed (O) – the number that did vote UKIP – to expected (E) 
value for each cell (O/E) and log transforms it. Those logged ratios could be modelled in a saturated 
Poisson regression model, with a separate parameter for each cell to derive an estimated ratio along 
with its credible intervals (CIs; these are interpreted in the same way as confidence intervals in 
standard regression models, although because they are Bayesian estimates they need not be 
symmetric around the estimated ratio value). These estimates from the saturated model may be 
unstable if based on small observed and/or expected values, so in the multilevel modelling the 
estimated logged O/E ratios are down-weighted towards no effect of the observed being equal to 
the expected when they are based on small absolute numbers. In this way the analysis is protected 
from any over-interpretation of unreliable effects (i.e. substantial differences between the observed 
and expected values) in cells where either O or E, or both, is small, whereas distinctively high or low 
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ratios based on reliable evidence (i.e. large numbers of observations) are not down-weighted. As the 
equivalent of fully-saturated models are fitted, all of the interactions among the ‘independent’ 
variables (in the example here, age, sex, and qualifications) are taken into account. 
 
Little is gained by simple modelling of the O/E ratios with a separate parameter for each cell, 
as in, for example, multinomial logistic regression models. The main advantage of deploying a 
multilevel, random effects model is that it involves the pooling of information across all cells 
(Gelman and Hill, 2006). The estimated ratios are precision-weighted so that where they are based 
on small numbers they are shrunk back towards a value (when exponentiated) of 1.0 (i.e. the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the observed and expected values) This procedure involves 
Bayesian pooling of information – a data-driven adaptive procedure for handling the uncertainty 
associated with sparse data within the contingency table (Beck and Katz, 2007; Jones and 
Spiegelhalter, 2011; Gelman, 2014). 
 
For each contingency table cell, therefore, the model produces a logged (O/E) precision-
weighted rate, where an exponentiated value of 1.0 indicates that the observed value is equal to the 
expected. These exponentiated estimated rates have a natural interpretation: an estimate of 2.0 for 
a particular group indicates that they voted at twice the rate for UKIP across all types of 
respondents; while a value of 0.5 indicates that support is only half the overall rate for the entire 
sample. Moreover, the associated credible intervals indicate the degree of support for that estimate; 
we have used 95% credible intervals to distinguish types of people who are more or less typical in 
support for a party. Frequentist confidence intervals apply to the data and allow an inference about 
what would happen in repeated samples; thus you would expect 95 per cent of the intervals of 
repeated samples to include the population parameter. Bayesian credible intervals are more natural 
and apply to the parameter and not the data, giving a 95 per cent probability that the parameter 
falls between the lower and upper values given the span of the uncertainty. Bayesian credible 
intervals can thus be interpreted in a similar way to frequentist confidence intervals (although 
formally they should not be), which is why we have appropriated the term ‘significant’ for cells 
which have good empirical support that they are distinctively high or low.  
 
This explicitly exploratory procedure seeks patterns in a contingency table but by anchoring 
the results to the null hypothesis of no effect we gain greater confidence in all of the estimated 
values than would be the case from other modelling strategies based on a saturated model. 
Shrinkage automatically makes for more appropriately conservative comparisons while at the same 
time not reducing the power to detect true differences. Appendix 1 give the specification of the 
model version applied here and more technical details about estimation. 
 
4. Age, sex, qualifications and voting in England, 2005-2015 
 
To illustrate the approach, we used the 2015 British Election Study (BES) Wave 6 data; respondents 
were asked immediately after the election if they had voted then and, if so, for which party; they 
were also asked how they had voted at the previous two elections (in 2010 and 2015). To reduce the 
size of the contingency table and to focus on a situation in which all respondents faced the same set 
of party choices, we excluded respondents from both Scotland and Wales (Northern Ireland is not 
included in the BES), along with the very small number who reported voting for other than the 
parties that contested virtually all of the 532 English constituencies – Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, UKIP and Green; we also omitted respondents in the constituency where the Speaker was 
a candidate as, by custom, this is not contested by the major parties. This gave a sample of 20,966 
respondents (unweighted); the reported voting behaviour substantially under-estimated the number 
of abstentions – as is common in such studies – but as our main interest is to demonstrate relative 
differences between and within groups, this is not important to our findings. We also analysed the 
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respondents’ recalled votes at each of the two preceding general elections – in 2005 and 2010 – to 
explore whether there was continuity or change in partisan preferences by the different groups 
across the three elections.  
 
The models were fitted using MCMC estimation within the standard MLwiN software with 
default priors imposing as little prior information as possible on the estimates, so that the results are 
data-driven, a highly desirable situation in an exploratory data analysis (Jones and Subramanian, 
2014). Three ‘independent’ variables are deployed: sex is the usual binary division; age is divided 
into six groups (18-25; 26-35; 36-45; 46-55; 56-65; and 66 and over); and educational qualifications is 
in four groups (1 – none; 2 – up to and including those obtained at the normal school leaving age; 3 – 
those obtained after age 16, except for degrees and diplomas; and 4 – degrees and diplomas; for 
shorthand in the tables these are referred to as four classes). The ‘dependent’ variable has six 
categories – voted Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green, and UKIP, plus Did Not Vote. This 
gives a 2 x 6 x 4 x 6 contingency table comprising 288 cells, giving a mean of 73 respondents per cell 
but a median of 44 indicates a positively skewed distribution. 
 
For each of the dependent variable’s six categories, the modelling procedure provides an 
estimate of the ratio of the observed number of respondents to the expected number in each of the 
48 cells of the sex-by-age-by-qualifications cross-classification, with the latter derived from the 
underlying assumption that the proportion voting for each party – or abstaining – is invariant across 
all 48 cells. A ratio of 1.0 indicates that the observed and expected numbers are the same; a ratio 
greater than 1.0 that the observed number is greater than expected; and a ratio less than 1.0 that 
there are fewer there than expected. Because those ratios have associated credible intervals, 
whether any ratio is ‘significantly’ less or greater than 1.0 can also be assessed. 
 
The resulting estimated rates are shown in Figures 1-6; those significantly larger than 1.0 are 
shown in bold and underlined, and those significantly smaller than 1.0 are underlined and italicised. 
Each figure relates to one of the six voting options. Horizontally, each is divided into two blocks, one 
each for males and females, and each of those is divided into six rows for the age groups. Vertically, 
the tables are divided into three blocks for the three elections, with each block divided into four 
columns for the educational qualifications – those with no qualifications are in the left-hand column, 
those with degrees/diplomas in the right. Because age is held constant (i.e. the respondent’s age in 
2015), there are no estimated rates for those aged 18-25 in 2015 for the 2005 and 2010 elections. 
 
For voting Conservative (Figure 1) the dominant pattern – for both males and females – is 
significantly greater than expected support from those aged over 65 in 2015, across all four 
qualification groups; in both 2005 and 2015 (but not 2010) the party also got significantly more 
support than expected – though not across all groups – from those aged 56-65. But there is also a 
substantial difference between males and females. Among females, younger voters – especially 
those in the higher two qualification groups – were significantly less likely than expected to vote 
Conservative (with rates as low as 0.46); this was not the case for males, however, for whom the 
rates were not only much larger (close to 1.0) but also statistically insignificantly different from 1.0. 
 
Figure 2 also shows a major difference between males and females in their propensity to 
vote Labour. At the 2015 election, the party gained significantly more support than expected in each 
of the two most qualified groups across all age groups below 56, as well as from middle-aged 
females among those with lower or no qualifications. But there was no such strong support among 
males of the same age and with the same qualifications: most of the estimated rates there are larger 
than 1.0, but only two of them are significantly greater than 1.0. These differences are more muted 
at the previous two elections, when Labour got significantly above average support from older males 
with no qualifications and from middle-aged females across all qualification categories. 
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Figure 3 shows that the Liberal Democrats got significantly greater support than expected at 
both the 2015 and 2010 elections from those with the highest qualifications – degrees and diplomas 
– with little difference between males and females. Countering that, their support was significantly 
less than average among those with either no, or only up to school-leaving age, qualifications; in 
many of the cells, however, although the estimated rates were low (below 0.7 in several cases) they 
were not significantly smaller than 1.0, reflecting the small number of observations in many of those 
categories (e.g. young people with no qualifications). At the 2005 election, however, there were 
fewer significant differences than at the later contest, especially among males. Support for the 
Liberal Democrats was relatively widespread then; when their vote share collapsed by two-thirds 
between 2010 and 2015, their support base became socially more polarised between those with 
degrees and others (on which see Fieldhouse et al., 2006; Cutts et al., 2010; Cutts and Russell, 2015). 
 
For the Green party (Figure 4), support was sufficient for estimates of variations across 
qualifications, sex and age groups to be calculated for the 2015 contest only. (The Greens got only 1 
per cent of the votes in 2010, when they contested 335 seats; in 2015 they fielded 573 candidates 
and gained 3.8 per cent of the votes.) Not unsurprisingly, the pattern of their support is very clear: 
significantly higher than expected among the younger and better-qualified voters, especially 
females; significantly less than expected among those who were older and less-qualified. 
 
UKIP’s support – as much other analysis has indicated (e.g. Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015; 
Evans and Mellon, 2016; Ford and Goodwin, 2016; Mellon and Evans, 2016) – was concentrated 
among the old and those with no or only school-leaving age qualifications (Figure 5), with a 
substantial difference between males and females. At each election, the estimated rates were 
significantly greater than 1.0 for all males aged 56 and over in the lower two qualification categories; 
for females, there were many fewer significantly high rates – none in 2005 and only one in 2010, and 
at all three contests females with degrees/diplomas were significantly less likely to vote for UKIP 
than expected for all those aged under 65, whereas there was only one such low rate for males in 
2010 and none in 2005. This exploration of interactions shows UKIP’s support was clearly 
differentiated not only separately by age, sex and qualifications but also in combination. Well-
qualified old males were significantly more likely than expected to vote UKIP in both 2010 and 2015; 
well-qualified females in the same age group were not. 
 
Finally, Figure 6 shows the pattern for those who reported that they Did Not Vote. Here the 
differences are as expected – those with no or few qualifications were significantly more likely to 
abstain than the better-qualified, and the young were much less likely to turn out than their older 
peers; countering that, the estimated rates for older people and those with the highest qualifications 
were significantly smaller than 1.0. Those differences were largely common across both sexes, but 
the estimated rates were generally more pronounced (i.e. different from 1.0) among males than 
females. In 2015, for example, the estimated rates for females with no qualifications were higher in 
all but the oldest age group than those for males. 
 
These analyses sustain the argument that exploration of the interactions among 
‘independent’ variables may uncover important differences both between and within groups that 
‘traditional’ analyses cannot. An example of such a ‘traditional’ analysis is given in Table 1, which 
reports a multinomial logistic regression analysis of the 2015 election outcome. The significant 
coefficients reported there in part replicate the general patterns shown in Figures 1-6 – females, 
young people and less-qualified individuals were more likely to vote Labour than Conservative than 
were males, old people and those with degrees, for example – but they do not highlight (as Figure 2 
so clearly does) that the differences between males and females in their propensity to support 
Labour is significant among those with higher qualifications but not among those with none. 
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(Because in multinomial logistic regressions one of the categories of the dependent variable is set as 
the comparator, no direct information is given by the regression output of the pattern of voting for 
that component – in this case the Conservative party – and it has to be computed separately. The 
modelling approach employed here does not suffer from that disadvantage.) Similarly, the 
regression coefficients indicate very little difference across the four qualification groups, because (as 
Figure 4 shows) there are differences within each of those groups by age. Further the regression 
shows a significant difference between their propensities to vote Liberal Democrat rather than 
Conservative only between the oldest and youngest age groups – mainly, it would seem, because the 
differences between age groups in their support for the Liberal Democrats vary substantially by 
qualifications (Figure 3). 
 
Overall, the main significant differences in Figures 1-6 show that in 2015: 
• Older people – at all qualification levels – were more likely to vote Conservative than their 
younger counterparts among females, but among males whereas older people were also 
significantly more likely than expected to vote Conservative there was not a compensating 
significant likelihood that younger males did not vote Conservative. 
• Females, especially those with either post-school or degree-level qualifications, were 
significantly more likely to vote Labour than expected, but a similar pattern was not 
apparent for males. 
• There was significantly greater support for the Liberal Democrats among the well-qualified 
than expected, and less than expected among those with few or no qualifications – across 
both sexes. 
• Young, well-qualified individuals of both sexes were more likely than expected to vote Green 
whereas older, less-qualified individuals were significantly less likely to. 
• Older, less-qualified males – and, to a lesser extent, females too – were significantly more 
likely to vote UKIP whereas younger, more-qualified females – and, to a lesser extent, males 
too – were significantly less likely to.
2
 
• Young females – to a greater extent than young males – were significantly more likely to 
abstain than expected, whereas older persons were less likely to. 
While some of these differences – notably those for voting Liberal Democrat and Green – were 
clearly revealed by the multinomial logistic regression model, fitted without interactions, many of 
them were not.
3
 Furthermore, several of the patterns exposed in Figures 1-6 show substantial and 
significant changes over the three most recent elections: the growing trend for well-qualified 
females, but not males, to vote Labour, for example; and the increase in the significant small 
numbers of well-qualified females, and to a lesser extent males, voting UKIP. 
 
5. Did the patterns change? 
 
Figures 1-6 contain a great deal of information. To summarise the general patterns– and in particular 
to confirm whether there were substantial differences in voting by age, sex and qualification across 
                                                          
2
 This undoubtedly reflects differences in respondents’ attitudes towards the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage. The 
2015 BES data show that at the time of the 2015 election (i.e. in wave 6) whereas on an 11-point scale, where 
0 equals strongly dislike and 10 strongly like, 10.8% of males aged 18-25 gave Farage a rating of 8, 9 or 10, only 
3.6% of females in that age group did so. 
3
 We did fit further models including the interactions. If the three two-way interactions alone are entered, 11 
of the 25 possible interactions between sex and age were significant, as were 7 of the 15 involving sex and 
qualifications and 24 of the 90 interacting age and qualifications (11 of those 24 were for those not voting). 
When the three-way interactions are also added, 7 of the 90 were significant, compared to just 3 of the 15 
two-way sex and age interactions, 3 of the 15 sex and qualifications interactions, and 27 of the 90 for age and 
qualifications. When the three-way interactions are fitted, however, the SPSS© output indicates collinearity 
among the variables and that the validity of any estimated coefficients is uncertain. 
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the three elections – we have extended the analysis using a hybrid model with fixed effects (Jones et 
al., 2016). The models described above allow for maximum differences in the random part; the 
hybrid model additionally includes estimated fixed effects for Vote (i.e. the six categories deployed 
in Figures 1-6) when interacted with age, sex and qualifications to distinguish the main patterns. 
Table 2 gives the results. 
 
The initial Model 1 in Block 1 consists of a single term in the fixed part which is simply an 
overall average, while the estimated variance and its credible intervals summarises the unexplained 
differences between cells around this average. The lower 2.5% credible intervals do not approach 
zero so that there are genuine differences between the cells. Models 2 and 3 include the main effect 
of Vote plus Vote by Year interactions so that there are now 6 and 18 terms in the model. The 
unexplained between cell-variance has clearly been reduced as we distinguish the underlying main 
patterns. To assist model selection we use the Deviance Information Criterion, which is a badness of 
fit measure penalized for estimated model complexity; this is a by-product of the Bayesian MCMC 
estimation (Spiegelhalter et al 2002). Better models have a smaller DIC and some commonly applied 
rules of thumb are that a difference of 4-7 from the best model has considerably less support, while 
a model with difference of 10 or more indicates that the worse model has virtually no support and 
can be omitted from further consideration (Jones and Subramanian, 2014). The introduction of the 
terms for Vote and Vote by Year have resulted in substantial improvement shown in the sizeable 
reduction in the DIC and this latter model is taken into successive blocks. 
 
Subsequent modelling blocks add to the Vote by Year interaction by including an additional 
variable initially as an interaction between the new variable and the Vote, and then as a two-way 
interaction with Year and then as three-way interaction with Vote and Year.   Block 2 thus introduces 
terms for Sex and the key improvement comes with the Vote by Sex interaction but the further 
interactions do not lead to further improvement. Block 3 introduces Qualifications and there is a 
very substantial lowering of the DIC when a Vote by Qualifications interaction is included but a 
worsening of fit when Qualifications by Year interactions are included. Block 4 gives the results when 
Age is included and this time the best model does involve an interaction between Age and Year – 
there is evidence that the age effects have changed over elections.  The final block includes Age, Sex 
and Qualifications and the best model with the lowest DIC is Model 2 in which there is an Age by 
Year interaction and interactions between Vote and Sex and Vote and Qualifications.  Further 
elaborations do not bring about improvements. It is also clear from examining the variance term that 
the residual unexplained differences between the cells have become negligible so that the main 
patterns have indeed been captured by the fixed effects. 
 
The easiest way to appreciate the results of the preferred Model 5.2 (especially since it has 
80 terms) is graphically in Figure 7, shown without credible intervals for clarity. The graphs show the 
modelled rate for each Vote outcome for different Age groups at the three elections when 
Qualifications and Sex are held constant at their average values.
4
  For voting Conservative and 
Labour there is no change over the three elections; at each, voting Conservative increased by the 
same amount with age – holding year, sex and qualifications constant – whereas for Labour there 
was a slight downward trend with age at each contest. The pattern of voting Liberal Democrat was 
invariant with age – ceteris paribus – with the decline in its level of support apparent in 2015.  
 
Voting for UKIP and for the Green party, and non-voting, differed much more by age across 
the three elections than was the case with voting Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat – with 
sex and qualifications held constant. For both voting Green and Not Voting there was a very 
substantial decline with age, with its intensity greater in 2015 than at the previous two contests; 
                                                          
4
 The marginal predictions are readily made by the customised predictions facility in MLwiN which has been 
designed for this specific purpose (Rasbash et al, 2012).  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
12 
 
complementing that pattern, the intensity of the difference between age groups voting UKIP also 
increased across the three contests – with older people much more likely than their younger 
counterparts to vote for that party in 2015 than in 2005 and 2010. At the ‘core’ of British voting 
patterns, therefore, variations in support by age remained largely constant for the three parties that 
dominated British politics for some four decades, but the age divide widened very considerably on 
the ‘periphery’ – both in voting for the newer, growing parties and in abstentions. 
 
6. Voting and attitudes 
 
This paper has argued that ‘holding constant’ socio-demographic variables in regression models of 
voting behaviour means that analyses are unable fully to uncover the roots of party support; they 
cannot answer the question ‘do members of specified social groups vary in their attitudes, and 
hence in their propensity to support one party rather than others?’. To address that question, this 
section takes the patterns identified in Figures 1-6 and, for selected examples, inquires whether 
there are attitudinal differences – as explored in the 2015 BES surveys – consistent with those 
differences in voting propensities. 
 
For the first example, Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents in each sex, age and 
qualifications category who said in 2015 that measures to protect the environment have either not 
gone nearly far enough (NF) or have gone much too far (TF). Those who gave the former response 
should have been more likely to vote Green than those who gave the latter response, so the pattern 
of responses should match that of significant differences in Figure 4. With very few exceptions, that 
is the case: across each row increasing percentages saying NF and decreasing percentages saying TF 
indicate greater support for the Green party’s position among the more qualified; whereas down 
each pair of columns the increasing percentages saying TF and the declining percentages saying NF 
indicate that older voters were less inclined towards the Green position than their younger 
counterparts. 
 
To evaluate this conclusion further, we modelled the numbers giving each of the five 
responses to that attitude question (not gone nearly far enough; not gone far enough; about right; 
gone too far; and gone much too far) by age, sex and qualifications – as in the analyses of voting 
patterns. The left-hand block of four columns in Figure 8 identifies those groups significantly more or 
less likely to believe that environmental policy had not gone nearly far enough: those with degrees 
and diplomas were significantly more likely to say that this was the case than expected; older people 
in the lower classes were significantly less likely to. The central block similarly identifies the groups 
who thought that policy had gone much too far: most of the significant ratios were for the better-
educated females, who were much less likely than expected to think policy had gone too far. The 
final block of columns shows voting Green in 2015 (repeating the relevant parts of Figure 4): 
comparison between it and the previous two blocks shows that voting Green was concentrated 
among those groups who wanted more environmental protection. This clearly sustains our 
argument that we get a fuller appreciation of who votes for which party, and why, by analytical 
strategies that incorporate both socio-demographic and attitudinal variables, since the latter are not 
independent of the former. This was formally confirmed by regressing the estimated ratios for those 
voting Green in 2015 against those for respondents saying that environmental policies had not gone 
nearly far enough (i.e. across the 48 sex by age by qualifications cells; the standard errors associated 
with the regression coefficients are in brackets): 
 
VG = -0.181 + 1.169NFE                          r
2
 = 0.545 
          (0.171)  (0.154)  
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where VG is the modelled O/E ratio for voting Green and NFE is the modelled O/E ratio for 
environmental protection policies have not gone far enough. 
 
The second example, in Table 4, looks at attitudes to immigration in 2015 – whether 
respondents thought it was bad or good for the economy, on a seven-point scale. Given that one of 
UKIP’s main arguments at the election was that immigration should be restricted – claiming that it 
was depressing wages (especially for the lower-paid) and putting pressure on social services – the 
expectation was that anti-immigration attitudes should characterise the older and less-qualified 
respondents, especially males; Figure 5 shows they were more likely than expected to vote UKIP. 
These expectations are largely borne out. Among males, for example, the percentage saying that 
immigration was bad for the economy (i.e. a score of 1 on the 7-point scale) fell very substantially in 
all age groups across the four qualifications categories; one-quarter of those aged 18-25 with no 
qualifications said it was bad compared to just 7 per cent among those with the highest-level 
qualifications. Similarly, the percentage within each qualification category saying it was bad 
increased with age – more than tripling among those with degrees/diplomas. Very similar patterns 
emerged in responses to a question on whether immigration enriches or undermines cultural life. 
 
These data were also modelled and the left-hand block of estimated ratios in Figure 9 shows 
that well-qualified respondents were significantly less likely to say immigration was bad for the 
economy than expected, whereas those with lower qualifications or none were significantly more 
likely to express the opposite opinion. The next block shows that the well-qualified were more likely 
than expected to believe that immigration is good for the economy whereas older people – 
especially females – were less likely. These patterns coincide markedly with the patterns of support 
for UKIP in 2015 shown in the right-hand block: well-qualified people, who were pro-immigration, 
were unlikely to vote UKIP; older, less-qualified individuals were very likely to. This is confirmed by 
the regression: 
 
VUKIP = 0.101 + 0.840IBE                          r
2
 = 0.695 
              (0.103)  (0.081)  
 
where VUKIP is the modelled O/E ratio for voting UKIP and IBE is the modelled O/E ratio for 
immigration is bad for the economy.  
 
A similar analysis was undertaken using a question asking individuals whether they thought 
immigration undermined or enriched British culture. The pattern of O/E ratios is shown in Figure 10, 
and the relevant regression: 
 
VUKIP = 0.459 + 0.810IUC                          r
2
 = 0.742 
              (0.151)  (0.074)  
 
where VUKIP is the modelled O/E ratio for voting UKIP and IUC is the modelled O/E ratio for 
immigration undermines British culture. 
 
A core argument here is that voters’ socio-economic and -demographic characteristics are 
very likely to be related to their political attitudes – and thence to their voting behaviour. Such inter-
relationships are smothered in the analytical procedures deployed in most British voting studies 
based on survey data, however. Conventionally, in recent work they are ‘held constant’ by 
incorporating the socio-demographic variables in regression equations, which are then largely 
ignored. The two-stage procedure adopted here illustrates the relative poverty of that approach – 
which largely ignores what types of individual have what attitudes underpinning their electoral 
choices. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Two main arguments have been developed in this paper – both substantive and technical. First, 
many recent British voting studies have wrongly claimed that socio-economic and -demographic 
characteristics are no longer important influences on party choice and worthy of study in their own 
right (though see Evans and Tilley, 2017); instead, an over-emphasis is placed on the links between 
attitudes and behaviour without any detailed exploration of their socio-structural underpinnings. 
There is little doubt that the decline of partisan alignment means a greater fluidity in voter decision-
making than in earlier decades (hence the need for more exploratory data analysis), but, as 
demonstrated here, age, sex and educational differences remain very clear influences on the pattern 
of attitudes and voting at recent elections in England. 
 
Secondly, the favoured technical approaches to analysing voter survey data prevent their 
richness being fully explored. One clear example of that demonstrated here concerns the 
interactions among the variables – almost invariably ignored in regression analyses. It is wrong to 
assume intra-group homogeneity without inquiring whether, for example, older, well-qualified 
males vote in the same way as their female contemporaries. Greater attention to the interactions is 
needed – although this may often be difficult. The analyses reported here used a very large survey 
data set with an average of 78 observations per cell of the 288-cell matrix, and yet – as Figure 11 
shows – many of those cells had few observations, making the computation of reliable rates difficult. 
Most voting studies include more than three ‘independent’ categorical variables – and in most of 
them, therefore, exploring the full richness of their relationships with the ‘dependent’ variable is 
restricted. 
 
Most British – and other – voting studies using survey data are quasi-exploratory; few test 
specific hypotheses and instead seek expected relationships based on other empirical findings and 
general expectations rather than any ‘strong theory’. As such, methods of exploratory data analysis 
should be more frequently deployed in teasing out the relationships within a data set.  The method 
advanced here offers considerable potential to that end. 
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Appendix. Specification and estimation of the model 
Initially, we fit a two-level random-effects Poisson model separately for each election. We do this to 
impose as little as possible structuring on the results. (We also impose as little structure as possible 
in the model formulation so that the individual cell estimates are shrunk towards an overall average 
and not say the main effect for age – we are trying as much as possible to let the data speak for 
themselves.) The specification of each model is:   
	~		
() 
			 =	(		) 
 = 	() +  +	  
				~	(0, "#); 		%&'| = 	 
Where individuals, i, are placed in cells, j, the latter being defined by all combinations of the 
categorical variables so that j here is 2 sexes by 6 age groups by 4 educational categories by 6 
parties, that is 6 outcomes for 48 types of people. The term   is the observed count for, say, voted 
UKIP in 2015; while  is the expected count of the number of people that voted UKIP if the overall 
rate of support for that party applies to each and every cell. So if overall 15% voted UKIP and there 
are 100 people in that cell; then the expected value will be 15. As is common with count data we 
assume that they come from an underlying Poisson distribution with a mean of pi.  This mean rate is 
non-linearly related to an overall average rate () plus a random departure – the random effect 
() for each cell. This exponential relationship is transformed to a linear model by taking the natural 
logarithm (the log link). The ()	is known as the offset which has its parameter constrained to 
1 (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). The effect of this is that the model analyses differences not in the 
log of the counts but rather the log relative rate taking account of , the expected values. Because 
the overall sums of the observed and expected values are the same, the overall average ()  can be 
anticipated to be zero, which becomes 1.0 when exponentiated. The random differentials () if 
positive indicate that the cell has a higher rate than expected; if negative, a lower rate. 
Exponentiating these values give the relative rate so that the value 2 represents a doubling of the 
rate. Assuming that these differentials come from a Normal distribution, they are summarized by the 
variance term, "#, which captures the differences between all cells (having taken account of Poisson 
variation) and is based on information for all the different subgroups.  
 
 The final line of the specification (as is the norm in Poisson models) states that the variance 
of the observed counts conditional on the underlying rate is equal to the underlying rate (the mean 
and variance of a Poisson distribution are always exactly the same). This allows the other estimates 
in this generalized linear model to take account of the Poisson stochastic nature of the underlying 
counts. In practice in this two-level model there is exactly the same set of units – the cells – at level 1 
and level 2; that is, each level 2 unit has exactly one level 1 unit. This views the aggregated counts at 
level 2 as consisting of replicated responses for individuals at level 1. This use of a pseudo-level is 
explained in Browne et al. (2005) in relation to the binomial model and allows the separation of the 
variance into exact Poisson at level 1 and over-dispersion at level 2 so that the higher-level variance 
summarizes the ‘true’ differences between cells over and above those expected from a random 
variation due to the absolute size of the count. The estimated  are shrunken or precision-weighted 
estimates (Jones and Bullen, 1994) – on the log scale they will be shrunk back to zero when they are 
unreliable; equivalently when exponentiated they will be shrunk back to the value of 1 of no effect.  
Reliability will be at a maximum when there are ‘true’ sizeable differences between cells and when 
the count is large enough to give a precise estimate of the log rate in any particular cell.  
 
 The hybrid model used subsequently in the paper to analyse the changing vote has the same 
basic structure but there are many more cells (768) to reflect we have different types of people at 
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three elections. The fixed part of the model is also extended to include m main effects and 
interactions ()) associated with a set of dummy variables (*) indicating cell membership in terms 
of the observed variables of Vote, Year, Age, Qualifications and Sex. 
 
 = 	() +  ++)*
,
)-.
+	 
 
The level 2 variance ("# ) now summarises the between cell differences that remain after taking 
account of the underlying patterns that have been extracted through the fixed terms. 
  
All the models were estimated in MLwiN software as Fully Bayesian models by using MCMC 
procedures, this allows the degree of support for the estimate, in the form of credible intervals to be 
obtained (Browne, 2012; Jones and Subramanian, 2014). As is common with Poisson models a long 
run of the MCMC simulation was used with 0.5 million monitoring runs after 5000 discarded burn-in 
iterations with default priors following an initial quasi-likelihood estimation. We checked that the 
burn-in was sufficient to achieve convergence to the equilibrium using a range of diagnostics and 
also examined via diagnostics the reasonableness of the between cell Normality assumption and this 
was met in all the analyses. 
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Table 1.  
Multinomial logistic regression of party choice against sex, age and qualifications at the 2015 British 
General Election (regression coefficients, with those significant at the 0.05 level or better shown in 
bold) 
 
 Labour LibDem Green UKIP DNV 
Intercept -0.63 -1.16 -3.05 -1.90 -3.02 
Sex (comparator: Female) 
Male -0.10 0.10 -0.14 0.23 -0.20 
Age group (comparator:  65<) 
18-25 0.76 0.22 2.15 -0.23 2.21 
26-35 0.68 0.10 1.50 -0.07 1.98 
36-45 0.70 0.08 1.33 0.22 1.46 
46-66 0.62 0.11 0.98 0.45 1.13 
56-65 0.34 -0.02 0.58 0.30 0.73 
Qualifications (comparator: None) 
School leaving-age 0.65 -0.60 -0.29 0.99 1.43 
Post school leaving age 0.19 -0.74 -0.56 0.68 0.83 
Degree/Diploma 0.08 -0.20 -0.14 0.29 0.34 
 
-2 log-likelihood 
Intercept only 4052.5 
Full model 1844.3 
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Table 2. 
Model comparisons for examining changing vote preferences  
Block Model Terms in the fixed part 
No. 
 of 
Terms 
Between 
cell 
Variance 
CIs 
DIC 2.5 97.5 
1 1 Constant 1 0.38 0.33 0.42 5535.7 
1 2 Vote  6 0.37 0.32 0.41 5525.6 
1 3 Vote by Year 18 0.18 0.16 0.20 5510.6 
2 1 Vote by Year + Vote by Sex 24 0.17 0.15 0.19 5458.4 
2 2 Vote by Year + Vote by Sex + Sex by Year 26 0.17 0.15 0.19 5459.3 
2 3 
Vote by Year + Vote by Sex + Sex by Year + 
Vote by Sex by Year 36 0.17 0.15 0.20 5461.2 
3 1 Vote by Year + Vote by Qual 36 0.11 0.10 0.13 5421.7 
3 2 Vote by Year + Vote by Qual + Qual by Year 42 0.11 0.10 0.13 5423.1 
3 3 
Vote by Year + Vote by Qual + Qual by Year + 
Vote by Qual by Year 72 0.12 0.10 0.14 5429.1 
4 1 Vote by Year + Vote by Age 24 0.18 0.15 0.20 5466.5 
4 2 Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year 56 0.08 0.07 0.09 5434.2 
4 3 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by Age by Year 96 0.08 0.07 0.10 5445.2 
5 0 Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year 56 0.08 0.07 0.09 5434.2 
5 1 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by Gender 62 0.07 0.06 0.08 5416.1 
5 2 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by Sex + Vote by Qual 80 0.01 0.01 0.01 5190.2 
5 3 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by SEx + Vote by Qual + Sex by Year 82 0.01 0.01 0.01 5190.6 
5 4 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by Sex + Vote by Qual + Sex by Year + 
Vote by Sex by Year  92 0.01 0.01 0.01 5195.1 
5 5 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by Gender + Vote by Qual +  Qual by 
Year  86 0.01 0.01 0.01 5193.5 
5 6 
Vote by Year + Vote by Age + Age by Year + 
Vote by Gender + Vote by Qual +  Qual by 
Year  + Vote by Qual by Year 116 0.01 0.01 0.01 5199.8 
The most parsimonious model is given in Bold. 
 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
24 
 
 
Table 3.  
Percentage of respondents to the 2015 BES saying that measures to protect the environment have 
gone not far enough (NF) or too far (TF), by sex, class and age. 
  
Qualifications None School Post-School Degree 
 NF TF NF TF NF TF NF TF 
Male 
Age group 
18-25 38 50 38 30 58 13 66 11 
26-35 61 11 34 27 46 17 49 14 
36-45 37 15 36 18 40 21 50 13 
46-55 31 26 38 19 41 20 52 17 
56-65 42 24 36 24 38 24 46 20 
66< 35 23 35 24 34 27 39 25 
Female 
Age group 
18-25 42 8 48 18 59 11 63 7 
26-35 51 18 41 16 50 12 57 5 
36-45 52 20 41 14 40 16 57 8 
46-55 40 21 42 13 45 12 48 10 
56-65 37 18 35 16 44 15 58 12 
66< 37 17 37 13 41 17 57 14 
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Table 4.  
Percentage of respondents to the 2015 BES saying that saying that immigration is good (G) or bad (B) 
for the economy 
 
Qualifications None School Post-School Degree 
 B G B G B G B G 
Male 
Age group 
18-25 25 56 12 20 16 47 7 44 
26-35 22 10 21 39 21 37 10 50 
36-45 28 26 34 19 27 32 12 45 
46-55 48 10 39 22 25 34 18 43 
56-65 49 17 36 24 27 34 15 44 
66< 45 20 34 31 26 32 23 42 
Female 
Age group 
18-25 38 10 27 22 18 32 12 41 
26-35 49 10 42 14 27 26 13 44 
36-45 60 12 44 21 31 23 18 40 
46-55 64 4 46 17 33 24 20 34 
56-65 45 10 42 18 33 23 17 42 
66< 53 19 39 21 31 30 17 43 
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Figure 1. Ratios of observed:expected numbers voting Conservative by Sex, Age and Qualifications in 
2005, 2010 and 2015. Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in bold and underlined; ratios 
significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. 
None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  2005    2010    2015    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.89 0.63 0.90 0.88 
 26-35 0.80 0.66 0.67 0.92 0.99 0.82 0.84 1.03 0.74 0.91 0.98 1.19 
 36-45 0.70 0.93 1.04 0.96 0.86 1.06 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.04 1.07 1.07 
 46-55 0.89 1.05 1.12 1.06 0.86 0.93 1.06 1.07 0.61 0.88 1.07 1.08 
 56-65 0.96 1.13 1.23 1.09 0.95 1.02 1.05 1.09 0.82 1.02 1.12 1.16 
 66< 1.19 1.49 1.50 2.40 1.19 1.32 1.37 1.28 1.08 1.18 1.56 1.28 
  2005    2010    2015    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.62 0.46 0.70 0.80 
 26-35 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.85 0.85 0.71 0.70 0.56 0.79 0.76 0.87 
 36-45 0.60 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.65 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.94 0.85 
 46-55 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.85 1.04 1.03 1.05 
 56-65 0.87 1.32 1.22 0.99 0.83 1.23 1.11 1.00 0.85 1.28 1.34 1.18 
 66< 1.28 1.61 1.54 1.23 1.32 1.18 1.43 1.05 1.30 1.64 1.56 1.28 
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Figure 2. Ratios of observed:expected numbers voting Labour by Sex, Age and Qualifications in 2005, 
2010 and 2015. Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios 
significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. 
None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  2005    2010    2015    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         1.18 0.99 1.03 1.09 
 26-35 0.99 1.09 1.22 0.88 0.79 0.98 1.08 1.03 0.77 1.10 1.20 1.01 
 36-45 1.13 1.32 1.02 1.05 1.19 1.07 0.91 1.09 1.48 1.01 1.10 1.06 
 46-55 1.00 1.22 1.02 1.10 1.18 1.18 1.09 1.20 1.15 1.15 1.06 1.14 
 56-65 1.27 1.11 0.94 1.03 1.24 1.05 0.95 1.14 1.07 0.99 1.00 1.02 
 66< 1.22 0.98 0.81 0.77 1.27 1.18 0.76 0.94 0.98 0.89 0.72 0.81 
  2005    2010    2015    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         1.27 1.10 1.34 1.31 
 26-35 0.71 0.80 0.93 0.89 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.27 1.10 1.28 1.30 
 36-45 1.27 1.31 1.26 1.07 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.09 0.80 1.21 1.25 1.40 
 46-55 1.05 1.30 1.28 1.11 1.29 1.18 1.17 1.20 1.30 1.15 1.19 1.24 
 56-65 1.31 1.00 0.98 1.11 1.28 1.01 0.85 1.14 1.14 0.92 0.98 1.15 
 66< 1.32 0.91 0.86 0.92 1.16 0.88 0.82 0.94 1.09 0.72 0.82 0.94 
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Figure 3. Ratios of observed:expected numbers voting Liberal Democrat by Sex, Age and 
Qualifications in 2005, 2010 and 2015. Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and 
underlined; ratios significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four 
qualification levels are: 1. None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. 
Degree.) 
  2005    2010    2015    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.84 0.59 1.31 1.66 
 26-35 0.75 0.74 0.89 1.20 0.95 0.93 0.93 1.21 0.96 0.52 1.08 1.37 
 36-45 0.75 0.48 0.90 1.16 0.76 0.71 1.09 1.27 0.77 0.44 0.91 1.80 
 46-55 0.69 0.73 1.29 1.20 0.61 0.78 1.07 1.18 0.49 0.71 1.27 1.66 
 56-65 0.68 0.85 1.23 1.39 0.75 0.89 1.22 1.16 0.56 0.70 1.19 1.37 
 66< 0.68 0.91 1.04 1.48 0.63 0.82 0.94 1.18 0.89 0.71 0.95 1.63 
  2005    2010    2015    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         1.04 0.49 0.77 1.14 
 26-35 0.70 0.57 0.84 1.57 0.83 0.59 1.01 1.50 0.82 0.64 0.93 1.47 
 36-45 0.66 0.55 0.87 1.40 0.66 0.72 1.08 1.40 0.95 0.65 0.67 1.43 
 46-55 0.67 0.71 1.20 1.16 0.65 0.91 1.22 1.26 0.52 0.63 1.14 1.13 
 56-65 0.73 0.92 1.15 1.47 0.77 0.81 1.15 1.29 0.67 0.82 1.21 1.37 
 66< 0.53 0.81 1.09 1.53 0.67 0.74 1.02 1.24 0.53 1.01 1.31 1.80 
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Figure 4. Ratios of observed:expected numbers voting Green by Sex, Age and Qualifications in 2015. 
Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios significantly smaller than 
1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. None; 2. No more than 
school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  2005    2010    2015    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.88 1.15 2.55 2.11 
 26-35         0.92 0.94 0.76 1.70 
 36-45         0.87 0.74 1.04 1.61 
 46-55         0.65 0.52 0.84 1.09 
 56-65         0.51 0.49 0.93 1.10 
 66<         0.53 0.36 0.54 0.51 
  2005    2010    2015    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.97 1.35 2.67 2.80 
 26-35         0.81 0.73 1.46 1.88 
 36-45         0.88 0.58 1.48 1.64 
 46-55         0.89 0.58 0.79 1.38 
 56-65         0.68 0.53 0.69 1.26 
 66<         0.53 0.55 0.46 0.99 
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Figure 5. Ratios of observed:expected numbers voting UKIP by Sex, Age and Qualifications in 2005, 
2010 and 2015. Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios 
significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. 
None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  2005    2010    2015    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.91 1.10 0.63 0.58 
 26-35 1.24 1.01 0.99 0.68 1.13 0.84 0.72 0.54 1.34 0.96 0.73 0.48 
 36-45 0.89 0.83 0.71 0.65 0.96 1.31 1.00 0.78 0.95 1.63 1.03 0.68 
 46-55 1.43 1.67 0.81 1.02 1.43 1.69 1.11 0.96 2.23 1.91 1.26 1.06 
 56-65 1.87 2.05 0.72 1.15 1.58 1.81 1.08 1.06 2.14 2.05 1.24 1.14 
 66< 1.78 2.08 1.62 1.26 1.59 1.55 1.56 1.55 1.89 1.60 1.40 1.22 
  2005    2010    2015    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         0.79 0.75 0.39 0.30 
 26-35 0.89 0.90 0.69 0.54 0.90 0.98 0.85 0.57 1.16 0.80 0.69 0.35 
 36-45 0.85 0.87 0.66 0.57 0.87 0.77 0.77 0.56 1.48 1.17 0.91 0.51 
 46-55 0.88 1.04 0.64 0.79 1.04 0.86 0.62 0.59 0.77 1.46 1.03 0.69 
 56-65 1.22 1.29 0.83 0.51 1.29 1.32 0.82 0.56 1.67 1.49 0.90 0.69 
 66< 1.13 1.04 1.23 0.69 1.02 1.21 1.01 0.72 1.57 1.21 0.99 0.84 
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Figure 6. Ratios of observed:expected numbers Not Voting by Sex, Age and Qualifications in 2005, 
2010 and 2015. Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios 
significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. 
None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  2005    2010    2015    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         1.39 2.96 1.31 1.18 
 26-35 1.60 2.24 1.72 1.67 1.37 2.20 1.97 1.22 2.04 2.30 1.61 1.05 
 36-45 1.65 1.53 1.45 1.21 1.43 1.47 1.31 0.86 1.61 1.49 1.2 0.90 
 46-55 1.60 1.10 0.89 0.78 1.74 1.35 0.80 0.60 1.67 1.11 0.97 0.55 
 56-65 1.10 0.87 0.84 0.68 1.22 1.09 0.85 0.67 1.40 0.96 0.66 0.61 
 66< 0.75 0.52 0.59 0.52 0.70 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.78 0.62 0.62 0.57 
  2005    2010    2015    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25         1.80 4.13 1.91 1.34 
 26-35 2.73 3.10 2.48 1.96 1.69 2.60 2.21 1.41 2.10 3.16 1.96 1.31 
 36-45 2.15 2.00 1.50 1.30 2.57 2.28 1.32 1.20 2.40 1.56 1.34 0.94 
 46-55 1.53 1.25 0.84 0.79 1.73 1.44 0.90 077 1.91 1.19 1.03 0.93 
 56-65 1.26 0.81 0.81 0.71 1.47 0.89 1.03 0.53 1.46 0.92 0.84 0.65 
 66< 0.72 0.56 0.39 0.57 0.71 0.59 0.48 0.60 0.52 0.49 0.91 0.52 
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Figure 7. The relationship between Age and voting for each political party and abstaining, with Sex 
and Qualifications held constant at their average values, across the three elections 2005-2015 
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Figure 8. Ratios of observed:expected numbers saying that Policies to Protect the Environment Have 
Gone Not Far Enough and Have Gone Too Far, and Voting Green in 2015, by Age, Sex and 
Qualifications. Ratios significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios 
significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. 
None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  Not 
Far 
   Too 
Far 
   Vote 
2015 
   
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25 0.97 1.00 2.03 1.97 1.14 1.10 0.95 0.77 0.88 1.15 2.55 2.11 
 26-35 1.09 0.83 0.89 1.54 1.14 1.11 0.90 0.75 0.92 0.94 0.76 1.70 
 36-45 0.81 0.84 1.23 1.63 1.10 1.39 1.02 1.15 0.87 0.74 1.04 1.61 
 46-55 1.05 0.76 0.84 1.23 1.78 1.51 1.03 1.20 0.65 0.52 0.84 1.09 
 56-65 0.83 0.66 0.97 1.29 1.93 1.76 1.53 1.44 0.51 0.49 0.93 1.10 
 66< 0.56 0.62 0.79 1.91 1.74 1.44 1.73 1.70 0.53 0.36 0.54 0.51 
  Not 
Far 
   Too 
Far 
   Vote 
2015 
   
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25 1.01 0.89 1.39 1.61 0.91 0.79 0.42 0.46 0.97 1.35 2.67 2.80 
 26-35 0.97 0.75 0.89 1.55 1.05 0.87 0.66 0.41 0.81 0.73 1.46 1.88 
 36-45 0.93 0.53 1.05 1.38 1.11 0.71 0.76 0.51 0.88 0.58 1.48 1.64 
 46-55 0.64 0.72 0.81 1.51 1.35 0.85 0.73 0.65 0.89 0.58 0.79 1.38 
 56-65 0.92 0.67 0.93 1.22 0.97 1.04 0.82 0.67 0.68 0.53 0.69 1.26 
 66< 0.68 0.66 0.84 1.25 1.04 1.11 0.85 0.99 0.53 0.55 0.46 0.99 
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Figure 9. Ratios of observed:expected numbers saying that Immigration is Bad and is Good for the 
Economy, and Voting for UKIP in 2015, by Age, Sex and Qualifications. Ratios significantly larger than 
1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios significantly smaller than 1.0 are shown in italics and 
underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. None; 2. No more than school-leaving age; 3. Post 
school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  Bad    Good    Vote    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25 1.14 0.74 0.43 0.35 1.03 0.87 2.45 2.73 0.91 1.10 0.63 0.58 
 26-35 1.19 1.19 0.65 0.31 1.54 0.85 1.49 2.09 1.34 0.96 0.73 0.48 
 36-45 1.14 2.34 0.92 0.55 1.40 0.70 1.07 1.61 0.95 1.63 1.03 0.68 
 46-55 2.11 1.55 0.82 0.66 1.05 0.65 0.69 1.48 2.23 1.91 1.26 1.06 
 56-65 2.31 1.62 0.88 0.73 0.73 0.60 0.93 1.33 2.14 2.05 1.24 1.14 
 66< 1.98 1.43 0.91 0.88 0.75 0.57 0.61 1.13 1.89 1.60 1.40 1.22 
  Bad    Good    Vote    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25 1.16 1.02 0.48 0.36 0.84 1.11 1.29 2.06 0.79 0.75 0.39 0.30 
 26-35 2.13 1.66 0.92 0.50 0.92 0.68 0.73 1.79 1.16 0.80 0.69 0.35 
 36-45 1.62 2.10 1.53 0.57 0.77 0.54 1.03 1.44 1.48 1.17 0.91 0.51 
 46-55 2.06 1.34 1.17 0.70 0.76 0.31 0.86 1.22 0.77 1.46 1.03 0.69 
 56-65 2.69 1.78 0.99 0.71 0.46 0.40 0.68 1.16 1.67 1.49 0.90 0.69 
 66< 2.35 1.65 0.97 0.63 0.40 0.54 0.52 1.32 1.57 1.21 0.99 0.84 
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Figure 10. Ratios of observed:expected numbers saying that Immigration Undermines (Bad) and 
Enriches (Good) Society, and Voting for UKIP in 2015, by Age, Sex and Qualifications. Ratios 
significantly larger than 1.0 are shown in b old and underlined; ratios significantly smaller than 1.0 
are shown in italics and underlined. (The four qualification levels are: 1. None; 2. No more than 
school-leaving age; 3. Post school-leaving age; 4. Degree.) 
  Bad    Good    Vote    
M Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25 1.03 0.90 0.46 0.49 0.99 0.95 1.74 2.01 0.91 1.10 0.63 0.58 
 26-35 1.35 1.17 0.69 0.44 1.31 0.78 1.21 1.81 1.34 0.96 0.73 0.48 
 36-45 1.03 1.49 0.91 0.58 1.00 0.74 0.96 1.63 0.95 1.63 1.03 0.68 
 46-55 1.66 1.46 0.95 0.85 0.91 0.67 0.80 1.14 2.23 1.91 1.26 1.06 
 56-65 1.92 1.71 1.07 0.91 0.59 0.56 0.77 1.22 2.14 2.05 1.24 1.14 
 66< 1.89 1.63 1.15 1.15 0.57 0.57 0.82 0.87 1.89 1.60 1.40 1.22 
  Bad    Good    Vote    
F Qual. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Age 18-25 1.11 0.78 0.39 0.33 0.94 1.36 2.25 2.04 0.79 0.75 0.39 0.30 
 26-35 1.61 1.15 0.81 0.48 0.94 0.70 0.90 1.80 1.16 0.80 0.69 0.35 
 36-45 1.32 1.63 1.00 0.53 0.90 0.59 0.99 1.69 1.48 1.17 0.91 0.51 
 46-55 1.59 1.58 1.02 0.67 0.75 0.48 0.94 1.54 0.77 1.46 1.03 0.69 
 56-65 2.15 1.68 1.02 0.75 0.52 0.44 0.87 1.18 1.67 1.49 0.90 0.69 
 66< 2.13 1.49 1.16 0.70 0.43 0.58 0.65 1.57 1.57 1.21 0.99 0.84 
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Figure 11. Histogram showing the number of observations in each cell of the Age by Sex by 
Qualifications by Voting (6 x 2 x 4 x 6) matrix 
 
 
